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Abstract— The existence of market power in the electricity market is a recurrent 
issue.  Measuring  and    understanding  market  power  practices  in  the  Iberian 
electricity  market  turn  out  to  be  interesting:  though  a  liberalized  market,  two 
integrated firms control 80% of total demand and there is a strong  - often direct -  
intervention of government in the market. For various reasons, among which the 
difficulty  in  obtaining  reliable,  extensive  data  stands  out,  market  power  in  the 
Iberian electricity market has rarely been measured. This work aims to contribute 
to a better knowledge of the way market power occurs. We calculate the elasticity 
of  residual  demand  to  evaluate  the  two  dominant  firm’s  market  power,  using 
hourly bides in the Spanish spot market for the period July-August 2004 to 2006. 
Although our approach was highlighted by Frank Wolak work on the electricity 
sector, we extend it and discuss its constraints. We discuss the results obtained in 
the light of the evolution of the electricity sector during that period.  
 
JEL classification: L13 
Keywords—  Market  power,  wholesale  market,  residual  demand  curve  elasticity, 
government intervention  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The  application  of  traditional  market  power  indicators,  based  upon  concentration 
measures, is disputable in the electricity sector. Besides the number and average size of 
firms, other factors can seriously restrain competition: 
 
￿  The  incentives  to  production  differ  according  to  whether  the  company  is  public  or 
private, to market structure and market design. 
￿  Demand elasticity. 
￿  The growing rate of the output. 
￿  Entry and exit barriers. 
￿  Product differentiation. 
 
Each one of these factors can play an important part in the way the Electricity market 
really works.  
Thus,  a  low  concentration  level  may  simply  point  out  that the producers with larger 
installed capacity have (strategically) chosen to produce less than the amount they were 
expected to do. This can raise prices and make them to benefit from low demand elasticity. 
The  electricity  market  modelling  is,  most  of  time,  based  on  the  Cournot  Model. 
Competition is driven by quantities (closer to reality than the Bertrand model taking into 
account the capacity constraints).  
Sometimes, it is based on hybrids models (with prices and quantity strategies) which seems 
to be the most consistent way to determine the existence of market power. In this modelling 
process, the demand curve cannot be the market aggregated curve because, in the electricity 
sector, the elasticity of demand is lower than the unity, being close to zero at peak hours.  
Then, producers are able to practice high prices and, theoretically, in extreme situations, 
almost infinite prices. Obviously, this doesn’t happen, owing to the fact that each producer 
faces a residual demand curve, i.e, the total demand deduced by the quantities supplied by 
his competitors. In this context, the elasticity of demand is higher and the producers bid 
include finite prices. Even if the elasticity of the aggregated demand was zero, it would be  
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enough to have a competitor supplying a fringe market to make that residual demand curve 
to cross the Y axe, therefore, to have a maximum price. 
A producer (i) residual demand curve ) (p Di is given by: 
￿ ¹ - = i k k i p S p D p D ) ( ) ( ) (                       (1), 
 where  ) (p Sk  is  the competitor k supply. 
Therefore,  the  residual  demand  curve  of  a  producer  i  proceeds  from  the  difference 
between total demand and total supply deduced by the producer i supply. 
 
II.  THE RESIDUAL DEMAND ELASTICITY AS A   MARKET POWER INDICATOR 
A – A Survey 
The  model  which  sustains  the  application  of  elasticity  of  residual  demand  as  a 
methodology to measure market power has been developed by J. Baker e T. Bresnahan 
(1988).  This  methodology  has  originally  been  developed  to  measure  market  power  in 
product differentiated industries. The authors use a partial equilibrium model. Thus, the 
residual demand curve of a firm 1 varies according to the quantities supplied by the firm 1, 
structural demand variables and the competitors’ cost curves, as follows: 
) , , , , , , ( 1
1
1
I I I I W W Y Q R P q b a =                     (2) 
Where: R
1 is firm 1 inverse residual demand,  1 Q  is the amount ( quantity ) supplied by 
firm  1,  Y   are  the  exogenous  variables  entering  the  demand  system,  W is  the  vector  of 
industry-wide factor prices,  I W  is the union of all firm-specific factor prices,
I a represents 
the  aggregation  of  own-price demand elasticities of all firms except 1,
I b  the variables 
which determine the costs of each firm and 
I q  is the conduct variable of each firm. 












e h h h                              (3) 
Where,  R
1 h   is  the  inverse  elasticity  of  residual  demand  for  firm  1, 
11 h   is  the inverse 
elasticity of residual demand which results from firm 1 supply, 
i 1 h  is the inverse elasticity of  
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residual demand which results from firm 1’s competitors’ supplies and 
1 i e  is the effect of 
firm 1supply on the quantities supplied by its competitors. 
Based  on  Stackelberg’s  model  or  more  complex  consistent  conjectures  equilibrium 
models the authors find a linear relationship between the elasticity of residual demand and 














-                              (4) 
In this model there is no distinction between residual demand curve and the demand 
curve the firm is facing. 
However,  as  Baker  and  Bresnahan  state,  this  relation  occurs  since  there  is  no 
oligopolistic strategic variables which could affect the equilibrium.  Unfortunately, this is 
not the case for most electricity markets. 
 
B – The Electricity sector 
As mentioned above, in a context of very low elasticity of residual demand, as it happens 
in the electricicity sector, the concept of elasticity of residual demand is very useful to 
enable the determination of market power. Upon this concept, Frank Wolak (2000) built an 
explanatory model for producers’ behaviour in the electriciity sector, which allows, under 
certain conditions, to measure market power without having to resort to the calculation.of 
marginal cost. 
In power markets, prices are generally defined for each hour. In those cases, the residual 
demand which is  faced by a firm in a certain hour corresponds to the global demand in that 
hour less the aggregate supply bid curve of all other market participants for the same time. 
For each hour, a bidding supply curve can be built which, for the conditions which sustain 
the  profit  maximization  model  defined  by  Wolak,  can  cross  all  possible  curves  of  the 
residual demand. 
The firm will determine the pair quantity/price, which maximizes its profit, associated to 
a residual demand curve and will do this exercise for all possible residual demand curves. 
This way, whatever the residual demand curve is, i.e., the global demand and competitors 
bids, a firm j can maximize its profit at hour h, applying the following equations:  















- =                                             (6) 
Equation (6) presents the unilateral market power which owns firm j at hour h, where Ph 
is the market price in that hour, cmgjh is the marginal cost of firm j at hour h and ejh is the 
elasticity of residual demand of firm j at hour h. 
Notwithstanding, significant amounts of bilateral contracts, future contracts, in parallel 
with a spot market can disable the application of this equation (Borestein, Bushnell and 
Wolak, 2002), as it will be shown. 
Finally,  it  has  to  be  said  that  the  validity  of  this  equation  depends  on 1 > e .  From 
quantities supplied such that  1 < e , the firm doesn’t maximize its profit, but can define 
prices its own way. In such price region, profits decrease in quantity and increase in price. 
The following figure illustrate maximization revenue strategy of a firm i which, for a 
determinate residual demand, define the pair price/ quantity, PM /QM, which maximizes its 
profits.  Those  are  maximized  at  the  point  where  marginal  revenues,  obtained  by  the 
derivative of the residual demand curve, equal marginal costs, which are equal to the firm’s 

















A B C  
Fig. 1 Profit maximization taking account the residual demand  
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III - THE MODEL  
Wolak’s model (Wolak 2000) supposes the firm can sell electricity in the spot market and 
it can reduce its risk through hedge contracts. 
The following optimization problem of strategic biddings occurs: 
  ( ) ( ) ) , max ) (
) (
i S S i i
i S
- p ,  
where  ( ) ) i S -  is the vector of strategies of the remaining firms. 
Firm A profits at period i of day d are maximized in the following way: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) id id id id Qc pc p cmg p p DR p - - - = p                    (7) 
Where  id DR  is the residual demand, p is the market price,  id pc  is the contract’ price, 
( ) id id Qc pc p-  will be the payments made by the contracts purchasers to firm A in case of 
id pc p <  . Whether id pc p > , the payments will be made in the opposite sense. 
The  aim  of  the  firm  is  to  find  the  bid  function  which  leads  to  a  market  price 
corresponding to the highest revenues. 
The effect of a residual demand high elasticity is significant on market prices, being 
amplified  when  the  risk  is  covered  by  contracts.  Thus,  the  higher  the  elasticity  of  the 
residual demand, the lower the price will be. Also, the difference between quantities traded 
with and without hedging contracts will rise. In this situation firms do prefer to cover their 
risk with hedging contracts. The increasing weight of such contracts makes the quantities 
sold in the market to decrease. Thus, elasticity goes up.  
In such a kind of market, there is a sort of a vicious circle: the more risk adverse the 
firms are, larger quantities will be sold outside the spot market and more firms will react 
aggressively in the spot market.  Therefore, the higher elasticity will be. In short: a high 
elasticity leads to a contraction of the demand in the spot market and to the increase of 
hedging contracts. 
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IV - THE MODEL STRUCTURE 
Our empirical work concerns the measurement - through the calculation of the elasticity 
of residual demand - of Endesa and Iberdrola market power. Together, they supply 75% of 
Iberian electricity demand.   
Empirical data correspond to hourly bids in the Spanish electricity spot market during the 
months of July and August between 2004 and 2006. The data (www.omel.es) concerning 
market agents’ purchase and sale bids (price and quantity). Those bids allowed us to rebuild 
the supply and demand hourly curves. For such period, we had to analyse from 20 000 to 
50 000 bids each day.  
Firstly, for each one of the firms and for each hour, we calculated total supply, then 
deducting their bids, in order to obtain the supply curves of their competitors. As, for equal 
prices, quantities bid and quantities matched are not exactly the same, quantities bid are 
adjusted to reflect the quantities matched. 
 Hourly clearing price is defined, where demand and supply cross. As we can’t define the 
elasticity  of  the  residual  demand  in  a  particular  point,  the  arc  elasticity  of  the  residual 
demand around the market clearing price is defined. 
The market clearing price cannot be defined by the crossing of the firms’ (Endesa and 
Iberdrola) residual demand curves and the supply curve. It is defined by the crossing of total 
supply and demand. 
Therefore, we had to deduce indirectly prices above and under the market clearing price 
for  the  residual  demand.  For  this  purpose,  prices  just  above  and  just  under the market 
clearing  price  were  fixed  and  quantities  demanded  associated  to  those  prices  were 
calculated. Then,  prices of the residual supply (of Endesa’s and Iberdrola’s competitors) 
which were closest to those prices  - above or under those prices, according to the fact that 
they were related to the price above or under the market clearing price - were fixed, as well 
as  quantities associated to those  calculated  prices. 
Finally,  residual  supply  quantities  above  or  under  the  market  clearing  price  were 
deducted, for those prices, from the demand quantities. After the calculation of the residual 
demand for those two prices, the determination of firm’s i elasticity of the residual demand 
at hour h was obtained, applying the following equation:  
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low P high P
low P DR high P DR
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= e  (8) 
Where ) (high P h , is the price just above the market clearing price,  ) (low Ph  is the price just 
under the market clearing price, )) ( ( high P DR h jh , is the residual demand associated to the price 
just  above  the  market  clearing  price, )) ( ( low P DR h jh ,  )) ( ( high P DR h jh ,  is  the residual demand 
associated to the price just under the market clearing price. 
Firm j’s monthly average values of the inverse elasticity of the residual demand at hour h, 
and their respective standard deviations   were calculated.  
 
V – EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A.  Inverse Elasticity of the residual demand 
The results are shown for all values, without extreme values (higher than percentile 95).  
As it can be observed, the results obtained are not conclusive for 2004 and 2006. In 2006, 
when extreme values were withdrawn, some values might point out the existence of market 
power, namely values related to August in Endesa case. However, the values are so high 
that they cannot be considered relevant. 
In July 2005 for those two producers, off-peak hour values and peak and half-peak hour 
values, in the case of Endesa,  present interesting results, although also high. Because of 
that, they have to be taken into consideration very carefully. In August of that year, values 
related to Iberdrola at off-peak hours are the only results which can be considered, although 
they have to be equally taken cautiously. 
 We also made a complementary econometrical analysis in order to explain such results.  
 
B.  Correlation between price and elasticity 
An  econometrical  analysis  has  been  done  about  the  correlation  between  the  inverse 
elasticity of residual demand and the market clearing prices. Parallel to this analysis, the 
time series stationarity has been studied, as well as the dependent variables endogeneity. 
Dickey-Fuller’s test realized allows to conclude that the serials inverse elasticity of residual 
demand are stationary.   
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TABLE I  



























Average 1,46 0,75 1,87 0,77 2,50 1,93 4,23 2,29
Standard 



























Average 5,22 0,89 4,28 1,12 12,18 1,80 10,28 2,51
Standard 


































Average 0,40 0,33 1,21 1,03 0,71 0,64 0,85 0,77
Standard 



























Average 0,79 0,65 1,72 1,51 1,03 0,92 1,36 1,23
Standard 


































Average 1,23 1,07 1,73 1,56 2,50 1,84 1,01 0,85
Standard 



























Average 1,06 0,87 1,20 1,05 1,14 0,91 0,87 0,79
Standard 








The endogeneity analysis between the inverse elasticities of residual demand and the 
market clearing prices, through the Wu-Hausman’s test, showed that those variables were 
endogeneous. Therefore, the linear regression was redefined using instrumental variables. 
The chosen regressions were validated through the Sargan’s statistics. 
In  July  and  in  August  2004,  we  observed  that  there  was  no  correlation  between  the 
market clearing price and the inverse elasticity of the residual demand. 
 
TABLE II – REGRESSION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE ON THE INVERSE ELASTICITY OF 
IBERDROLA’S RESIDUAL DEMAND, JULY AND AUGUST 2004 
Coefficient Standard deviation t statistic
Coefficient 19,392 40,957 0,4737 [0,636]
Price -6,6167 16,061 -0,41196 [0,680] 
 0,006 [0,940]
Sargan's statistic
(Chi-Square distribution) [Prob.]  
 
TABLE III 
 REGRESSION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE ON THE INVERSE ELASTICITY OF ENDESA’S 
RESIDUAL DEMAND, JULY AND AUGUST 2004 
Coefficient Standard deviation t statistic
Coefficient -174,8522 1259,1 -0,13887[0,890]
Price 69,5239 16,061 -0,41196 [0,680] 
 0,0003 [0,985]
Sargan's statistic
(Chi-Square distribution) [Prob.]  
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In  July  and  August  2005,  for  a  significance  level  of  5%,  the  inverse  elasticities  of 
residual demand and market prices are correlated, both in both cases: Endesa and Iberdrola. 
The correlation occurred in the expectable sense: a price increase implies an increase in the 




 REGRESSION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE ON THE INVERSE ELASTICITY OF ENDESA’S 
RESIDUAL DEMAND, JULY AND AUGUST 2005 
Coefficient Standard deviation t statistic
Coefficient -2,3958 0,34269            -6,9912  [0,000]
Price 0,49277 0,04605             10,7007  [0,000] 
 6,1318 [0,190]
Sargan's statistic
(Chi-Square distribution) [Prob.]  
 
TABLE V  
 REGRESSION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE ON THE INVERSE ELASTICITY OF IBERDROLA’S 
RESIDUAL DEMAND, JULY AND AUGUST 2005 
Coefficient Standard deviation t statistic
Coefficient -2,6298 1,4274            -1,8424 [0,066]
Price 0,53704 0,22304             2,4078 [0,016] 
 1,4430 [0,695]
Sargan's statistic
(Chi-Square distribution) [Prob.]  
 
In July and August 2006, for a 5% significance level, only in the Endesa case the inverse 
elasticities of residual demand and market clearing prices were correlated. 
 
TABLE VI  
 REGRESSION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE ON THE INVERSE ELASTICITY OF IBERDROLA’S 
RESIDUAL DEMAND, JULY AND AUGUST 2006 
Coefficient Standard deviation t statistic
Coefficient 40,8951 29,0651           1,4070 [0,160]
Price -8,6375 6,7382           -1,2819 [0,200] 
0,043759 [0,834]
Sargan's statistic
(Chi-Square distribution) [Prob.]  
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TABLE VII 
 REGRESSION OF MARKET CLEARING PRICE ON THE INVERSE ELASTICITY OF ENDESA 
RESIDUAL DEMAND, JULY AND AUGUST 2006 
Coefficient Standard deviation t statistic
Coefficient -7,5733 4,2416            -1,7855 [0,075]
Price 1,6866 0,77582           2,1740 [0,030] 
 ,0075119 [0,931]
Sargan's statistic
(Chi-Square distribution) [Prob.]  
 
What can we conclude from these regressions? 
According  to  our  analysis,  they  corroborate  what  was  mentioned  previously.  Let  us 
explain why: 
In  2004,  the  firms’  bid  strategies  were  independent  from  the  market  prices.  On  the 
contrary, in 2005, the firms’ bid strategies were influenced by market prices. In 2006, the 
results were mitigated.  
Opposite to Endesa, in the case of Iberdrola, the relationship between market price and 
the inverse elasticity of residual demand, i.e., the mark-up, was not significant. 


























) ( ) (




-                    (9) 
Where Q(p) is  the demand function and Sc(p)  the competitor’ supply function. 
The first part is the price elasticity of demand, related to the demand. It is independent 
from firm’s strategy, since the behaviour of this variable is known. In higher demand hours, 
with hourly higher prices, the elasticity is lower. Therefore, the price elasticity of demand is 
inversely related to the evolution of the prices. 
The second part is the price elasticity of quantities supplied by firm’s j competitors. This 
elasticity depends on the strategies of firm j’s competitors. Generally, these strategies also 
lead to a decrease of elasticity with prices. In principle, the relationship between firm’s j 
elasticity  of  residual  demand  and  the  market  clearing  prices  would  be  decreasing  and, 
therefore,  the  relation  between  firm’s  j  residual  demand and the market clearing prices 
would be increasing.  
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Thus, the results both for Iberdrola and for Endesa, in July and August 2005, show an 
expected relation between market price and the mark-up. The random relations for Iberdrola 
in July and August 2006, and for both producers in July and August 2004 are due to the 
random behavior of those producer’s supply functions, taking into account that the demand 
behavior is stable. Therefore, in those periods the producer’s bid didn’t follow the known 
pattern, i. e.: 
 
￿   at low price hours, the producers bid large amounts, related to base load units, and  
￿    with the increase of prices, the bid reflected the higher variable costs units which have a 
lower capacity installed, the peak load units. Apparently, price independent bid strategy 
can  suppose  that  the  profit  maximization  -  producers’  main  objective,  -  is  achieved 
beyond the spot market. The existence of CTC, whose influence was total in 2004, as 
well as the existence of legal changes which occur in 2006 – namely, the price cap 
imposed to the firms belonging to the same group - can explain such strategies. 
 
VI - CONCLUSIONS 
The definition of market power through the methodology employed in this paper presents 
some restrictions. This methodology is based on Wolak’s model, but the first reference to 
the residual demand elasticity as a market power indicator appears in Bresnahan et al paper. 
Taking  Bresnahan  et  al  model,  a  direct  relationship  between  the  mark-up  and  the 
elasticity of the residual demand cannot be assumed when there are oligopoly strategies. 
Furthermore, Wolak shows (2000) that, when the energy traded is not limited to the spot 
power  market,  but  it  is  also  traded  trough  hedging  contracts,  the  elasticity  of  residual 
demand may not be able to measure market power. 
Those restrictions for applying the elasticity of residual demand are the reasons, jointly or 
separately,  which  explain  that  the  application  of  our  methodology  did  not  produce  the 
expected results. Thus, in 2004 the elasticity of residual demand calculated was very low 
(between 0,5 and 0,1), close to the values presented by Espinosa and Ciarreta (2006), for 
the period between 2001 and 2004  for the same producers. In 2005, as a result of the 
increase of pool’s prices, the elasticity of the residual demand increased. However, in some  
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cases, it was lower than the unit, which disabled the utilization of this variable for the 
market power definition. 
Besides the increase of fuel costs, 2005 was marked by a set of legal transformations in 
Spain which changed the Spanish market power rules. The delay of the payments of debt 
amounts to be paid through the CTCs mechanism was one of the consequences of those 
legal changes.  
In 2006, prices were close to 2005 prices and the elasticities of residual demand were 
slightly lower. That year, the Spanish Government established a cap for the energy traded 
between firms belonging to the same group. Also, the ending of CTC, often announced, 
finally occurred. The main result of those events was a significant decrease of the energy 
traded in the pool and the withdrawing of installed capacity by the second major producer, 
Iberdrola.  This  capacity  was  reintroduced  in  the  Spanish  electricity  market  through  the 
emergency technical market, which was much better paid. 
What led producers to bid for a production level, in such a situation where their residual 
demand curves  elasticities were lower than 1 and where profits  decreased with the amount 
produced (therefore, producers would not maximize their gains )? 
In  practice,  the  majority  of  Spanish  electricity  producers  was  framed  by  CTCs’ 
mechanism. This mechanism was aimed to make up for eventual losses which could occur 
with the liberalization of the wholesale market in 1997. CTC led firms to bid on the spot 
market independently of market clearing price. Thus, profit function is obtained through the 
following equation: 
F(￿i) = (CTCi36 +36- Ci(Qi))Qi(p)                        (10) 
The resulting profit maximization function defines that firms will produce up to those 
marginal costs are equal to 36 €/MWh plus the CTC’s unitary compensation: 
C’i(Qi)= CTCi36 + 36                                                 (11), 
where C’i(Qi) is the marginal cost of firm i. 
 Profits are maximized independently of price bid and firms are encouraged to produce 
up to marginal costs equal to 36 €/MWh plus the CTC’s unitary compensation. Those are 
the factors which explain why elasticity of residual demand is lower than the unit. CTC 
mechanism had the advantage of not encouraging market power strategies, because the bids  
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of the producers framed by CTCs’ mechanism are totally independent from market price 
variation. 
Did  the  existence  of  CTCs  until  June  2006  disabled  market  power?  The  answer  is 
negative for two reasons: 
 
￿  Firstly, not all power plants which bid in the Spanish wholesale market were framed by 
the  CTCs’  mechanism.  The  weight  of  power  plants  framed  by  CTC  in  the  total 
production decreased since the beginning of this mechanism, namely since 2004 when 
some new combined cycle natural gas power plant were launched. Those power plants 
mainly belonged to Iberdrola. 
￿  Secondly, the payments of the amounts due by the CTCs’ mechanisms became uncertain, 
due to:  changes in the methodology employed in its determination and also by the fact 
that the recovering of those amounts were often delayed and included in tariffs deficits
1, 
which characterize the Spanish electricity sector. 
Former works showed that directly, i.e., through the mark-up calculation (Fabra, Toro 
2004, see also DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, 2007) or indirectly, through 
the producers’ behavior analysis (see: Ciarreta, Espinosa, 2004 and Marques, Soares and 
Fortunato, 2006).  
Therefore, the fact that in 2005, for the first time in the analysed period, the elasticity of 
residual demand was lower than 1 in a certain period of the day, may be due to the decrease 
of  power  plants  framed  by  CTCs’  mechanism  in  the  set  of  power  plants  which  bid 
electricity in the Spanish market, jointly with the payment delay. 
2006 stands up as a turning point. Many legal measures were taken to clarify prices’ 
formation in the wholesale market and to limit market power, such as: 
￿  The end of CTCs (Real Decreto 7/2006). 
￿  The end of the obligation to trade the electricity in the pool market (Real Decreto 5/ 
2005). 
                                                            
1  The income generated by the Spanish tariffs has not been enough to cover the electricity sector firms’ cost, creating deficit, which 
payments to the firms are transferred to the future.  
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￿  The energy traded in the pool market between firms belonging to the same group is 
treated as bilateral contracts whose prices are limited to 42,35 €/MWh (Real Decreto 
3/2006 ). 
 
Those factors should led to an increase of the elasticity of the residual demand. However, 
it didn’t happen. In fact, there were many ways to skirt the traditional market rules. 
Those restrictions led electricity traded in pool market to significantly decrease its weight 
in total energy traded. on the contrary Bilateral contracts and the reserve system (emergency 
system), which are much better paid than the pool market, turned more important, namely 
in Iberdrola’s case. 
In what concerns the energy traded, in the market pool, between firms which do not 
belong to the same group, oligopoly strategies may have been developed in the pool market. 
Remember that, according to J. Baker e T. Bresnahan, the measurement of market power 
through the elasticity of residual demand doesn’t offer consistent results when there are 
oligopoly  strategies.  This  may  explain  the  non  conclusive  results  obtained  with  the 
elasticity of the residual demand analysis for 2006. 
Moreover, the price cap imposed to the wholesale market led, direct and indirectly, to the 
maintenance of the elasticity of the residual demand of the two major firms, which trade in 
the Iberian spot market, at a low level. 
In this framework, traditional market analyses are invariably affected. A complementary 
mark-up analysis may confirm those conclusions. 
Notwithstanding market power cannot be measured using this methodology, the results 
obtained, allow highlighting many forms developed by the market agents to skirt the rules 
imposed  by  the  Spanish  State  to  limit  market  power.  Those  results  are  useful  in  the 
Portuguese case,  taking account that in Portugal a mechanism similar to the CTCs, the 
CMEC, were applied, from 2007 for the majority of the Portuguese power plants which are 
actually operating. 
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